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The focus of this paper is to examine, in the light of the constantly expanding 
knowledge of dispute resolution , whether the Banking Ombudsman is a good 
model of dispute resolution for consumers. In doing this, the paper looks initially 
at the general field of consumer disputes to determine how the inherent 
characteristics of consumer disputes impact on the design of any dispute 
resolution process. The remaining part of the paper focuses solely on the 
banking industry and an analysis of the Banking Ombudsman, with the final part 
of the paper returning to a more general comment on issues of access to justice. 
The paper argues that the Banking Ombudsman meets the majority of the 
attributes of an effective dispute resolution process, but raises doubts about the 
consumer awareness of the scheme and discusses how this may affect the 
scheme. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibl iography) 
comprises approximately 13,125 words. 
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INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand's introduction of a Banking Ombudsman on 1 July 1992 was a 
significant event for several reasons. First, it was of interest to aggrieved 
banking customers who previously had no access to a quick, independent and 
inexpensive means of resolving disputes. For too long, the only options 
available to consumers involved in a dispute with a bank were to either complain 
directly to the offending bank or take the matter to court. Neither prospect 
appeared likely to obtain a satisfactory outcome for the customer, given the 
banks' significant power advantage in terms of information and financial 
resources. From the point of view of the banks, the establishment of the office 
was seen as a way to increase consumer confidence and enhance their public 
profile. 
Secondly, the move was a reflection of the wider trends in dispute resolution that 
were occurring within New Zealand. These trends recognised that the traditional 
system of adjudication was failing to provide a satisfactory remedy for many 
disputants and were reflected in an increased use of techniques such as 
negotiation, conciliation and mediation to resolve disputes. The move also 
provided a further illustration of the privatisation of justice in New Zealand.1 
The focus of this paper will be to examine in the light of the constantly expanding 
knowledge of dispute resolution , whether the Banking Ombudsman is a good 
model for dispute resolution for consumers. In doing this, the paper will look 
initially at the general field of consumer disputes to determine how the inherent 
characteristics of consumer disputes impact on the design of any dispute 
resolution process. Where possible, the paper will attempt to relate any general 
comments on consumer disputes to the more specific issues affecting banking 
consumers. The majority of the paper will focus solely on the banking industry 
1A Farrar "A Banking Ombudsman for New Zealand" (1992) NZLJ 320, 326 
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and an analysis of the Office of the Banking Ombudsman, with the final part of 
the paper returning to a more general comment on issues of access to justice. 
II THE NATURE OF CONSUMER DISPUTES 
A Overview 
New Zealand consumers have benefited in recent years from various statutes 
designed to protect their i!]_terests. Several pieces of legislation have attempted 
to redress specific abuses relating to credit g>ntracts, layby sales, motor vehicle 
sales and door to door sales.2 More recent legislation has attempted to redress 
the inherent power disparity between consumers and traders by granting 
consumers certain fundamental rights in their dealings with suppliers. 
I 
The Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, for example, created substantive private 
rights by guaranteeing consumers a number of rights in relation to the supply of 
goods and services. This Act has afforded greater protection to consumers of 
some banking services by guaranteeing that those services will be reasonably fit 
for their purpose. 
Furthermore, the Fair Trading Act 1986 created substantive public rights by 
prohibiting misleading and deceptive conduct by traders . Again , this Act has the 
potential to limit the number of disputes arising for banking consumers by 
requiring banks to ensure that misleading statements are not made about their 
services, including in advertising and promotional material. The Commerce 
Commission is the public authority charged with enforcing these public rights 
and has a practice of targeting certain industries to ensure compliance.3 
2Credit Contracts Act 1981; Layby Sales Act 1971 ; Motor Vehicles Securities Act 1989; Door 
to Door Sales Act 1967. 
30ffice of the Retirement Commissioner Review of the Banking Ombudsman and Insurance 
Ombudsman Schemes July 1997 6. 
..... 
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Arguably, public rights have limited value for the individual aggrieved consumer.4 
Such rights undoubtedly fulfil a significant role through the establishment of new 
trader norms that are more favourable to consumer interests. ~ wever, in many 
cases, the consumer will be more interested in restitution than retribution , 
focusing on their own private interests as opposed to the public interest that is -, 
harmed by deviant traders. 5 _J 
Therefore, effective dispute resolution processes are essential to ensure that the 
private substantive rights are able to be enforced. As Thomas argues, it is 
manifestly in the interests of consumers that there should be effective and 
accessible means of resolving disputes and enforcing rights.6 First, the 
possibility of recourse to such means for resolving a dispute strengthens the 
consumer's hand at the complaint or negotiation stage. Secondly, such means 
may have to be used in order to establish or enforce substantive rights. 
The limitations of the traditional court system of adjudication have been well 
documented. The inherent characteristics of consumer disputes means that the 
limitations of cost, delay and inflexibility are even more pronounced. While the 
introduction of Disputes Tribunals has gone some way to remedy these 
problems, the Tribunals still fail to address some important problems, especially 
in relation to consumers of banking services. 
This part of the paper will look initially at the characteristics of consumer 
disputes and how these impact on dispute resolution processes. It will then 
examine various dispute resolution mechanisms available to consumers to 
determine the extent to which they are capable of enforcing substantive private 
rights. 
4W Harris "Consumer Disputes and Alternative Dispute Resolution" (1993) 4 (3) Australian 
Dispute Resolution Journal 238, 239. 
5Above n 4. 
6R Thomas "Alternative Dispute Resolution - Consumer Disputes" (1988) 7 Civil Justice 
Quarterly 206. 
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B Inherent Characteristics Of Consumer Disputes 
Inherent characteristics of consumer disputes that have been identified as 
impacting upon dispute resolution are:7 
• a gross (.£QW disparity_b.etween tbe individuaLconsulJler and the 
institutional seller; 
• relative consumer ignorance concerning the technical aspects of 
the product; and 
• stakes that are small in dollar amounts but large in impact _on the 
~
confil,l!J.ler. , 
The increasing development of large, bureaucratic institutions exercising 
monopolistic or oligopolistic economic powers means that the individual in 
dispute with such institutions is no longer faced with someone in a roughly 
equivalent position.8 At the initial complaint stage, the organisation will almost 
always have more technical knowledge about its products ensuring that it is in a 
more powerful position to defend any complaints. 
The organisation will also generally feel safe in the knowledge that the consumer .._ 
is unlikely to take the complaint any further. Studies have shown that only a very 
small minority of consumer complaints are ever taken to c~ deed, the 
number of consumer complaints that ever reach any form of dispute resolution 
process may only be considered the tip-of-the-iceb~ The primary reason for 
this is that consumer disputes almost always involve "small claims". To pursue a 
small claim through the traditional court system would often outweigh the value 
of the claim itself. 
7Above n 4. 
8Above n 1. 
9R Thomas "Consumer protection: strategies for dispute resolution" in K Mackie A Handbook 
of Dispute Resolution: ADR in action (Routledge, London , 1991) 160. 
10Best, A & Andreasen , A "Consumer Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of 
Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints and Obtaining Redress" (1977) 11 Law & Soc 
Review 701 . 
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Even where the dispute may be large enough to consider taking litigation 
proceedings, a large organisation will still have a significant power advantage in 
terms of technical knowledge, financial resources and experience in litigation. A 
consumer engaged in legal action as a "once-in-a-lifetime" experience 1s 
described as the classic "one-shatter", often engaged in battle against a "repeat-
player" who will be more powerful and experienced in litigation, less susceptible 
to delays and more likely to have the benefit of legal advice and 
representation .11 
Therefore, cost and considerations about the time and energy needed to mount 
a complaint will serve as a disincentive for many consumers to take action. The 
lack of time and financial resources is likely to be even more pronounced in the 
case of shift workers or single parents.12 
However, the fact that it is often not economically viable to pursue a claim 
through the courts is merely one of the barriers preventing consumers from 
seeking redress for their grievances. It has been shown that a person's social 
position as well as their individual characteristics effects the extent to which they 
will perceive an experience as an injury, blame someone else, claim redress or 
get their claims accepted.13 Many potential complainants simply do not 
recognise that they have suffered an injurious experience.14 Those who do 
perceive there is a problem may be ignorant of their entitlements.15 
Some people are reluctant to voice their grievances as they f ar retribution or 
~ of social acceptance; some want to avoid entrapment in complex processes, 
11Above n 6, 207. 
12G McDonald "The Australian Banking Industry Ombudsman- can a level playing field be 
created?" (1991) 65 Law Institute Journal 190. 
13Felstiner, W, Abel , R and Sarat, A "The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: 
Naming , Blaming and Claiming" (1980-81) 15 Law & Sac Rev especially 633-635. See also 
above n 10. 
14See above n 13, 636. An injurious experience is any experience that is disvalued by the 
person to whom it occurs. While most people agree on what is disvalued , such feelings are 
not universal. 
15Above n 4, 239. 
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others believe that they lack sufficient resources to pursue their grievance, while 
yet others see complaining and confrontation as evidence of moral laxity or lack 
of independence.16 
A further barrier to pursuing a claim is that it is generally a prerequisite of most -di~pute resolution schemes that the consumer first try to resolve the i~sue by 
contacting the supplier directly. As McDonald argues, this presents no difficulty 
for the articulate consumer, and even less difficulty for the articulate consumer 
who has a power relationship with the supplier.17 However, consumers who are 
illiterate, who have English as a second language or who live in remote areas 
without access to support facilities will likely be at a distinct disadvantage in a 
dispute with a supplier.18 
To begin with , it is difficult for these consumers to obtain information about how, 
where and with whom complaints should be lad~. If they are able to overcome 
this, they are still faced with the problem of ensuring that the problem is 
presented in the most advantageous way. This highlights a disadvantage with 
informal dispute resolution procedures that is not present within the court system 
as a consumer would have the benefit of legal representation . 
It is possible for a consumer to exert a certain degree of influence in resolving 
disputes, depending on the nature of the relationship with the "supplier" - be it 
retailer, financier, insurer or other body. The nature of their relationship is 
affected by many factors. These include the length of time a consumer has been 
dealing with a supplier and the degree of trust that has been developed and also 
the frequency and scope of transactions and the likelihood of further (and larger) 
transactions.19 For instance, a consumer engaged in a one-off transaction, such 
as hiring a video operator for a wedding service, will be able to exercise less 
16D Kolb and S Sibley "Enhancing the Capacity of Organisations to Deal With Disputes" 
(1990) 6 Neg Jn/ 297 , 300. 
17Above n 12. 
18Above n 12. 
19Above n 12. 
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influence by virtue of the fact that the consumer is unlikely to use the supplier 
again, regardless of whether the consumer is satisfied or not with the service. 
Other factors include the exclusivity of the consumer's business to the supplier's 
survival and the power of the consumer, by virtue of his or her occupation. In 
this respect, a threat from a solicitor to take legal action is likely to have more 
effect on a supplier than the same threat from a lawn-mowing contractor.20 
Where there is legislation or publicly available industry standard codes which 
support the consumer, the consumer will also be able to exercise a greater 
degree of influence.21 
Consumers lacking influence in their relationship with suppliers may seek the 
assistance of community-based organisations such as the Citizens Advice 
Bureaus and the Consumers Institute as well as government agencies such as 
the Ministry of Consumer Affairs or the Commerce Commission. These 
organisations can help consumers by referring them to, or assisting them in, the 
appropriate means of dispute resolution . 
A recent example of this relates to the issue of odometer fraud in the motor 
vehicle industry. The Ministry of Consumer Affairs issued guidelines to 
consumers who had been effected by alleged odometer tampering by motor 
vehicle dealers. The Ministry provided a·fact sheet explaining where aggrieved 
consumers should go to obtain compensation as well as informing consumers 
how to gather the evidence necessary to succeed in bringing an action for 
compensation. This information was also publicised in the media.22 
20Above n 12. 
21 Further factors are discussed in above n 12. 
22See The Dominion September 13 1997, 3. 
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Ill HOW CAN CONSUMERS GET ACCESS TO JUSTICE ? 
An effective consumer dispute resolution mechanism should accommodate the 
inherent characteristics of consumer disputes as well as removing the barriers of 
costs , formality , psychological deterrents and delay. An ideal consumer dispute 
resolution process should be able to satisfy as many as possible of the following 
conditions:23 
• enJoy the confidence of both complainants and those complained 
against; 
• be accessible, easy to initiate and easy to use; 
• be speedy; 
• involve minimum expense to the parties and to the "sponsors" of the 
scheme; 
• be procedurally fair and achieve just results; 
• be actually and visibly impartial and independent; 
• be adequately resourced and financially secure. 
In practice, consumers are limited in the number of dispute resolution processes 
that they can use to gain redress for their grievances. Their primary means of 
obtaining resolution is to complain directly to the supplier or organisation 
concerned. Where problems cannot be resolved at this level , the intervention of 
a third party is required .24 The third party's role may be that of mediator, 
investigator or adjudicator. 
A discussion of the merits of mediation for the resolution of consumer disputes 
would widen the scope of the paper too far. Accordingly, the paper will briefly 
discuss the role the media can play as third-party conciliators and the ro le of the 
Disputes Tribunals as adjudicators. The purpose of this is to examine the 
usefulness of these processes to banking consumers and to present them as a 
23Above n 6, 216. 
24Above n 10, 734. 
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means of comparison with the form of dispute resolution offered by the Banking 
Ombudsman. 
A Self-help 
The simplest and least expensive remedy is for the consumer to make a 
complaint directly to the organisation concerned. An increased consciousness 
of consumer rights in recent years has resulted in many organisations adopting 
internal procedures for dealing with complaints . It is likely that a high proportion 
of consumer complaints could be satisfactorily resolved at this stage if the body 
concerned took seriously the need to treat those complaints with respect and 
courtesy. 25 However, it is clear that the factors discussed earlier relating to the 
influence a consumer can exert over a supplier will be significant in determining 
a satisfactory outcome for the consumer. 
A further contributing factor is whether there is an independent body for the 
consumer to go to if they are not satisfied with the outcome. This is essential for 
several reasons. First, it will be a significant factor in redressing the power 
imbalance in the consumers favour at the initial complaint stage. Secondly, it 
may act as an incentive for the organisation concerned to effect a satisfactory 
result for the consumer. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, a consumer is 
able to seek redress from a body that does not have a vested interest in the 
outcome, thus ensuring that the consumer feels that they have been treated 
justly. 
A further factor preventing disputes being resolved at this level stems from the 
fact that many people prefer to have their complaint heard by a body that is not 
personally involved in the dispute. As alluded to above, this accords with most 
peoples idea of justice and also reflects the fact that many people feel 
uncomfortable in complaining directly to the organisation that has wronged them. 
25Above n 4, 241. 
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B Media 
A second alternative is to involve the media through television programmes such 
as "Fair Go" or "Holmes". In these cases, it is unclear whether the media acts in 
the role of negotiator on behalf of the consumer, or as a mediator or conciliator.26 
It is likely that the role is will change depending on the case and the reporter 
involved. Disputes may be resolved in this manner by threatening the reputation 
or economic interests of the business through bad publicity. This publicity may 
serve to alert other consumers of practices or institutions of which to be wary. 
Although this method gives the consumer an effective means of redressing the 
power imbalance, it is an unstable form of dispute resolution in that it is 
dependent on the political and economic considerations of the media 
institution.27 Moreover, the media's agenda is often at variance with the agenda 
of the parties. While the parties main agenda is to come to some resolution 
which satisfies the interests of both parties, the media is invariably only 
interested in the news value of the dispute.28 
C Disputes Tribunals 
A more formalised process that exists within the traditional court system is the 
Disputes Tribunals . The Disputes Tribunals Act 1988 was intended to 
establish a system of essentially lay justice to deal with claims which having regard 
to the amount of money at stake are thought to be properly suited to determination in 
an informal way while always insisting on due observation of the rules of natural 
justice . 
The Tribunals provide a cheap, speedy and relatively informal system of dispute 
resolution . In hearing a claim , a Tribunal must first determine whether it is 
26Above n 4, 241. 
27Above n 4,241 . 
28Above n 4, 241 . 
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appropriate for it to assist the parties to negotiate an agreed settlement in 
relation to the claim. If the parties can reach an agreed settlement, the Tribunal 
may approve it and the settlement takes effect as if it were an order of the 
Tribunal. If not, the Tribunal is not bound by strict legal forms, rights and 
obligations, but must determine the dispute according to the substantial merit 
and justice of the case. 
The Disputes Tribunals are open to criticisms in a number of respects. Possibly 
the most significant, particularly for consumers of banking services, is that the 
monetary limit is very low. The Tribunals can only deal with claims that do not 
exceed $3000 or $5000 by agreement between the parties. Another drawback 
relating to disputes involving banks and their customers is the lack of special ist 
referees acquainted with the intricacies of banking law and practice.29 
D Brief Evaluation of the Processes 
With respect to accessibility, the processes discussed above are relatively easy 
to initiate and use. However, this must be qualified by the fact that difficulties 
still exist for consumers who are illiterate or have English as a second language. 
Not only are they less likely to know how, where and to whom they should go to 
when they have a grievance, but they will invariably be hindered by the fact that 
they will find it difficult to put their case across in the most favourable way. 
Accordingly, when complaining directly to an organisation, these consumers are 
less likely to have their complaint treated seriously and therefore be less likely to 
obtain a satisfactory outcome. In addition, because the informality of the 
Disputes Tribunals requires that the parties do not have legal representation , 
these consumers may also struggle to present their case in the best light. When 
this is coupled with the fact that the other side is likely to have better resources 
in terms of time, money, knowledge and the benefits of legal advice, the situation 
is even more unjust. 
29Above n 1, 327. 
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The processes are of little assistance, however to banking consumers where the 
amount of the dispute exceeds the jurisdiction of the Disputes Tribunals and 
where a complaint has been made to the bank and rejected . In these cases, it is 
submitted that a third party who is empowered to decide the facts and enforce a 
remedy is essential. In this respect, the Banking Ombudsman appears, at least 
on its face, to be an ideal solution for resolving disputes involving banking 
consumers. 
IV CONSUMERS OF BANKING SERVICES 
A Overview 
That an industry centrally concerned with the handling of a scarce and valuable 
resource , money, should occasion complaints will come as no surprise. 30 In 
1988, the then Minister of Consumer of Affairs noted that "of all problems faced 
by New Zealand consumers, credit problems are perhaps the most severe and 
widespread. "31 Accordingly, the introduction of the Office of the Banking 
Ombudsman in 1992 was a crucial step in ensuring that banking consumers had 
an accessible, independent and effective body to address these problems. 
Before undertaking an examination and analysis of the Banking Ombudsman as 
a form of dispute resolution , it is necessary to consider the factors that make 
disputes involving banking consumers so severe and widespread. First, the 
banking industry is of vital importance to the majority of New Zealanders. Not 
only are they involved with the banking industry on a day-to-day, personal level , 
but the prosperity of financial institutions also contributes to the growth of the 
economy.32 
30 J Birds and C Graham "Complaints Mechanisms in the Financial Services Industry" (1988) 
7 Civil Justice Quarterly 312. 
31 New Zealand Law Society Seminar Banking Law June - July 1994 
32Above n 30, 313. 
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Secondly, banks and other financial institutions offer essential services33 and 
exercise effective oligopolies over those services. In recent years, they have 
also broadened the scope of the services they provide. Whether consumers 
require a simple current account or credit for significant purchases such as a 
house or car, few will be able to operate their financial affairs without some form 
of assistance from banks. 
Thirdly, the de-regulation of certain government services in New Zealand in the 
last decade has meant that the customer base of banks has broadened. 
Beneficiaries of welfare services, for example, who previously received their 
payments from a state agency became bank customers simply by virtue of the 
fact that they could not receive payments unless they had a bank account. As a 
result, banking consumers now encompass a broader cross-section of society, 
ranging from people who may be considered relatively sophisticated and well-
educated to those who are comparatively uneducated and who have a low level 
of understanding of the banking system. 
The final reason why credit problems are so severe and widespread is that 
disputes involving consumers of banking services may potentially involve 
significant amounts of money. This is especially apparent when the significant 
costs of credit involved in property purchases are considered. However, even 
where the amount involved may seem large, the claim will usually be far more 
significant to an individual consumer than to the bank concerned. Thus, the 
inherent characteristics of consumer disputes that impact on dispute resolution 
processes are equally applicable in the context of banking disputes. 
33M Budnitz "The Arbitration of Disputes between Consumers and Financial Institutions: a 
Serious Threat to Consumer Protection (1995) 1 O Ohio State Journal of Dispute Resolution 
267, 320. 
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B Code of Banking Practice 
The Code of Banking Practice ("the Code") sets out "minimum standards of good 
banking practice to be observed by members of the New Zealand Bankers' 
Association when dealing with their personal customers in New Zealand". 34 
While the Code itself is voluntary, membership of the Banking Ombudsman 
scheme is obligatory to those banks that adhere to the Code. 
Although it does not have a statutory basis, the New Zealand courts have used 
the Code as an aid when dealing with cases under the Fair Trading Act. In 
Dungey v ANZ Banking Group, Doogue J commented that the Code "is a clear 
guide to good banking practice. A breach of it must always be likely to give rise 
to misleading conduct. "35 The Code is also enforceable through the 
Ombudsman's office in the sense that any complaints involving a breach of the 
Code will likely result in a decision and subsequent award of compensation 
against the bank. 
The first Code came into force in 1992, prior to the appointment of the Banking 
Ombudsman. This meant that the New Zealand Banking Ombudsman did not 
have any input into the drafting of the initial Code. However, it appears that this 
did not detrimentally effect the operation of the office. Indeed, it may have been 
advantageous given the problems experienced by the Banking Ombudsman's 
Australian counterpart. It has been argued that the differences of opinion 
between the banks and the Ombudsman over the content of the Code in 
Australia led to a souring of the relationship between the banks and the 
Ombudsman from the outset. 36 
34New Zealand Bankers' Association Code of Banking Practice (Second Edition) November 
1996 1. 
35(1997) 6 NZBLC 102, 194. 
36Personal Interview with Banking Ombudsman , Liz Brown, 18 September 1997. See also 
generally W S Weerasooria "The Australian Banking Ombudsman Scheme: Recent 
Developments" (1992) 2 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 225 . 
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A revised Code was produced in November 1996. It is more comprehensive 
than the first Code and rests on the key principle of what is fair and reasonable 
in all circumstances.37. The Banking Ombudsman was given the opportunity to 
make significant submissions on the draft Code and several of the comments in 
her Annual Report of 1995-1996 were incorporated into the new Code. While a 
detailed examination of the Code is beyond the scope of the paper, three issues 
are worth specific comment. 
First, the introduction to the Code contains a new provision requiring the Code to 
be monitored by the Banking Ombudsman. Discussion between the banks and 
the Banking Ombudsman has clarified that this provision is intended to be 
viewed merely as a reflection of existing practice, rather than granting the 
Banking Ombudsman a new mandate to review general banking practices. 38 
Accordingly, the practice of the Banking Ombudsman remains primarily as an 
individual grievance resolution office. However, where complaints that come into 
the office appear to reveal poor practice or practice that can be improved on the 
part of banks, the Ombudsman can report back to the banks with suggestions for 
improvement. 39 
Secondly, the Ombudsman remains unhappy with the provisions relating to 
banks' communication with their customers.40 Specifically, banks still retain their 
right to give important information to customers by way of notices in branches 
and the media. This is particularly concerning in terms of mortgage interest rate 
changes where customers may be unaware that they should increase their 
payments to cover the increased rate. Potentially, the actual cost of the credit 
may be increased by several thousands of dollars without the customer being 
aware of any detriment. 
37 Above n 34, 2. 
38Personal Interview with Banking Ombudsman , 18 September 1997. 
39 Above n 38. 
40Above n 38 . 
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The third issue that the Banking Ombudsman remains unhappy with is banking 
practice relating to the unauthorised use of credit and debit-cash cards. 
Complaints of this nature probably constitute the single largest number of 
complaints to the Banking Ombudsman.41 These complaints usually involve 
banks refusing to reimburse money that has been withdrawn from an account by 
an unauthorised person who has used the correct "PIN" number. Despite strong 
submissions from the Ombudsman on this point, the Code still does not make it 
clear who has the onus of proof of unauthorised use. 
In contrast, the counterpart Code in the United Kingdom requires a bank to 
prove gross negligence on the part of the customer before the customer loses 
their right to reimbursement. As a result, the Banking Ombudsman in the United 
Kingdom rarely has to consider these types of disputes.42 Presumably, the New 
Zealand banks are concerned that to adopt such an approach would result in 
them having to make too many pay-outs. 
C Internal Complaints Procedures 
Part 14 of the Code requires every bank to offer a free, three-stage complaints 
review procedure for handling complaints. The first stage involves the bank 
undertaking an initial review according to its own internal complaints procedure. 
The Code states that these procedures should be documented, accessible to 
customers and provide for the speedy resolution of disputes in a fair and 
equitable manner. The Code also requires banks to be accountable for the 
procedures which they implement and the results of those procedures. 
The second stage occurs only where a customer is dissatisfied with the bank's 
decision. In such a case, the bank should inform the customer that the 
complaint may be referred to the Banking Ombudsman for further consideration 
and inform the customer how to do so. The third and final stage involves the 
41Above n 38. 
42Above n 38. 
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complaint being considered by the Banking Ombudsman. It is a fundamental 
aspect of the scheme that only complaints which remain unsettled after being 
fully considered by the bank's internal procedures may be heard by the Banking 
Ombudsman. In this way, the Banking Ombudsman may be seen as an office of 
"last resort". 
It is essential that a complainant using an internal complaint procedure has 
recourse to someone who was not involved in the original decision. The usual 
progression of an internal dispute resolution procedure begins with an initial 
complaint being made at branch level. If the complaint is too complex to be 
sorted out at that level or the complainant is not satisfied with the response, the 
complaint may be referred straight to the complaints-handling division of the 
Head Office. Alternatively, it may pass through an extra step at regional level 
before being passed on to the Head Office. Irrespective of which path is taken, 
the bank will endeavour to reach an agreement and if the complainant is still not 
satisfied with the response, the bank will refer the dispute to the Banking 
Ombudsman. 
A positive side effect of the scheme is that banks internal complaints procedures 
have improved since the start of the scheme. In particular, banks are far less 
inclined to take an adversarial attitude toward the resolution of complaints 
investigated through the Ombudsman office. 43 The Banking Ombudsman has 
commented that banks that considered complaints to be the province of their 
legal department have caused the most difficulties.44 This is because legal 
departments tend to be made up of litigators and the Banking Ombudsman is not 
an appropriate forum for litigation tactics. As an example, the legal departments 
of some banks have occasionally raised jurisdictional issues on complaints that 
did not have much merit on their own and could have been disposed of in a short 
period of time. This led to unnecessary delays in resolving the dispute. 
43Above n 38 . 
44Above n 38. 
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V OFFICE OF THE BANKING OMBUDSMAN 
A Origins of the Office 
The Ombudsman concept is not new to New Zealand. ~6_3, New Zealand 
became the first English-speaking, common law, commonwealth country to adopt 
the unique system of dispute resolution that originated in Sweden. The term 
"Ombudsman" is derived from the Swedish word for "legal representative". The 
dictionary definition of the term centres on the concept of an official appointed to 
investigate the complaints of individual citizens or subjects against public 
authorities. 45 
Accordingly, the Ombudsman has traditionally been a Parliamentary office 
whose purpose is to provide individuals aggrieved by a decision of Government 
with a means of redress . The Ombudsman is viewed as an impartial person who 
is able to examine complaints about matters of administration, can access all the 
relevant facts and documents and decide whether the decision or act 
complained of was deficient according to a list of statutory criteria. 46 
The importation of the Ombudsman model of dispute resolution into the private 
sector is a new concept to New Zealand. Traditionally, it was thought that such 
remedies were unnecessary in the private sector because customers could 
"exit", that is take their custom elsewhere, if they were dissatisfied with the 
standard of service.47 It was only in the public sector, where choice was limited, 
that such intervention was necessary.48 
However, it has been argued for some time that the growth of large, bureaucratic 
institutions in the private sector has blurred the formal distinction between what 
45G Burton "A Banking Ombudsman for Australia" (1990) 1 JBFLP 29, 30. 
46N Tollemache "Banking Ombudsman in New Zealand" (1996) 26 VUWLR 233. 
47M Seneviratne1 R James and C Graham 'The Sanks! the Ombudsman and Complaints 
Procedures" (1994) 13 Civil Justice Quarterly 253, 255. 
48P McAuslan "Public Law and Public Choice" (1988) Modern Law Review 681 cited in above 
n 2. 
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is public and what is private. 49 The exercise by these institutions of monopolistic 
or oligopolistic economic powers are regarded as essentially governmental. 50 
Therefore, it has been agreed that such institutions should be subject to greater 
accountability through mechanisms like the Ombudsman. 
Unlike the United Kingdom, New Zealand moved to protect the use of the name 
"Ombudsman" by the passing of an amendment to the Ombudsman Act 1975. 
This amendment gave the Chief Ombudsman control over who could use the 
name and in what circumstances. The purpose of this was essentially to prevent 
the use of the name in such situations as internally appointed newspaper and 
college Ombudsmen who are little more than complaints advisers with no real 
independence. 51 It was considered that the use of the name "Ombudsman" by 
these officers could lead to a diminution of respect for the office and damage the 
credibility of "real" Ombudsmen.52 
Accordingly, the Chief Ombudsman has specified a number of criteria to apply to 
those seeking approval to use the name "Ombudsman" in New Zealand.53 First, 
the "Ombudsman" must be appointed and funded in a way that enables him or 
her to operate effectively and independently of the organisation over which they 
have jurisdiction. Independence and impartiality is seen as fundamental to any 
Ombudsman scheme and as such the "Ombudsman" should not be seen to be a 
counsel or advocate for special interest groups. Furthermore, the systems and 
procedures used by the Ombudsman must ensure fair and impartial decision 
making. 
Secondly, the "Ombudsman" is required to carry out impartial investigations of 
complaints free of charge, to make a conclusion based on that investigation and 
to achieve a remedy where appropriate. Thirdly, the Ombudsman is required to 
have a plain language charter that is available and accessible to the public and 
49 Above n 1, 326. 
50See P E Morris "The Banking Ombudsman" Pt 1 (1987) JBL 131 , 132. 
51 Above n 46, 239. 
52Above n 46, 239. 
53Chief Ombudsman New Zealand Criteria for the Use of the Name "Ombudsman" May 1997. 
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subject to periodic public review to assess its effectiveness and credibility. The 
Ombudsman is also required to produce a publicly available annual report. 
Finally, there must be an assurance of continuing and future resources to 
guarantee tenure to the Ombudsman and to ensure the effective and efficient 
administration of complaint handling. 
The Office of the Banking Ombudsman was the first scheme to be permitted to 
use the name "Ombudsman" and is one of only two such offices in New Zealand. 
Under the Retirement Income Act 1993, the Retirement Commissioner, Colin 
Blair is required to review the "effectiveness of private sector Ombudsman 
handling complaints in the savings/investments markets". In his most recent 
report, he concludes that the Banking Ombudsman scheme meets substantially 
all of the benchmarks required of the scheme in terms of accessibility, 
independence, fairness, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness.54 
B Institutional Structure 
Unlike the United Kingdom and Australian schemes that have a tripartite, 
corporate structure, the New Zealand scheme is a simpler, unincorporated form 
consisting of a Banking Ombudsman Commission ("Commission") and the Office 
of the Banking Ombudsman. The Office of the Banking Ombudsman is 
comprised of the Banking Ombudsman, Liz Brown, two full time investigators and 
two part time staff who carry out the initial complaints screening, as well as two 
administrative staff. 
The Commission consists of an independent chair ( currently a retired senior 
High Court Judge) together with two consumer and two banking representatives. 
The Commission has the responsibility for appointing the Banking Ombudsman 
540ffice of the Retirement Commissioner Review of Banking Ombudsman and Insurance and 
Savings Ombudsman Scheme and Consideration of the Need for a Statutory Ombudsman 
July 1997, 12. These benchmarks were developed in Australia by a Working Group chaired 
by the Federal Bureau of Consumer Affairs and were used by the Retirement Commissioner 
in the absence of any similar New Zealand material. 
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as well as considering and approving the Banking Ombudsman's budget. It also 
has the responsibility for levying and collecting the necessary funding from the 
Participating Banks55 in accordance with the Rules of the scheme. 
In addition, the Commission collaborates with Government or any corporations 
on any matters affecting banking and receives and considers recommendations 
from the Banking Ombudsman for changes to the Terms of Reference. The 
Commission can recommend to the New Zealand Bankers' Association such 
amendments to the Terms of Reference as it sees fit. In 1996, following 
recommendations by the Banking Ombudsman to the Commission, the 
Commission recommended and the Council of the New Zealand Bankers' 
Association accepted seven amendments to the Terms of Reference. These 
came into effect in November 1996. Although many of these amendments 
related to general administrative matters, an amendment providing for the award 
of compensation for "inconvenience" suffered by reason of the acts or omissions 
of a bank was a significant development for the bank customer. 56 
Funding for the scheme is obtained through levies on the Participating Banks. 
Half of this levy is determined on the basis of market share while the remainder 
is based on the proportion of claims made against the individual bank in the 
preceding year. 57 Although this may be cynically viewed as a disincentive for 
banks to inform their customers of the existence of the Banking Ombudsman, in 
practice this acts as an incentive for banks to resolve complaints internally, 
especially those which are low value.58 
Another effect of the operation of the funding system is that banks have 
frequently argued with the Banking Ombudsman over the point at which a 
55As at 1 December 1996, the Participating Banks are: ANZ Banking Group (New Zealand) 
Limited (incorporating Postbank); ASB Bank Limited; Bank of New Zealand; BNZ Finance 
Limited ; Citibank NA; Countrywide Banking Corporation Limited; Hongkong and Shanghai 
Banking Corporation Limited; The National Bank of New Zealand Limited; TSB Bank Limited; 
Westpac Trust. 
560ffice of the Banking Ombudsman Terms of Reference paragraph 14A. 
57Rules of the New Zealand Banking Ombudsman Commission : rule 10.3 
58Above n 38. 
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"complaint" has become a "dispute" for funding purposes.59 However, since the 
Banking Ombudsman's release of guidelines on this issue last year, it appears to 
have become less contentious. 
Clearly, it is the strength and credibility of the Commission that guarantees the 
independence of the Banking Ombudsman.60 Actual and perceived 
independence of the Banking Ombudsman is essential for the credibility of the 
scheme. It has been argued that the independence of the Ombudsman's office 
can only be truly guaranteed by placing the scheme on a statutory basis. 
In the United Kingdom, the Jack Report61 on the Banking Ombudsman was of the 
opinion that the scheme should be statutorily based. This opinion was based on 
what it perceived as a fundamental flaw in the institutional structure of the 
scheme in that banks retained the ultimate responsibility for the Banking 
Ombudsman's Terms of Reference. 
The Jack Report concluded that despite the "jealous safeguarding" of the 
independence of the scheme by the Council and Chairman (the equivalent of 
New Zealand's Commission) , and having a structure that "eliminated the 
possibility of interference" by the Participating Banks in the scheme's day-to-day 
operations, there was still the possibility that the scheme could be perceived as 
not genuinely independent of the banks. Burton refers to this colloquially as the 
"no smoke without fire" argument. 62 This point is more fully discussed below in 
the assessment of the independence of the office. 
59 A "complaint" is a case that appears to fall within the Terms of Reference in all respects 
except that it has not been through the bank's internal complaints processes. A "dispute" is a 
case that falls within the Terms of Reference and has been fully considered by the bank's 
internal complaints procedures without reaching a solution acceptable to all parties. 
60Above n 46, 238. 
61 This refers to Banking Services: Law and Practice (Dec 1988) , the Report of the Committee 
to review banking services in the United Kingdom. It was chaired by Professor Jack of 
Glasgow and hence is usually referred to as the "Jack Report" 
62Above n 45 , 35. 
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C Jurisdiction 
The Banking Ombudsman has, in theory, an extremely broad jurisdiction. 
Clause 1 of the Terms of Reference states that the Ombudsman's principal 
powers and duties are: 
• to consider complaints arising out of the provision within New 
Zealand of banking services by any Participating Bank principally 
to individuals, but also to groups of individuals, whether 
incorporated or not; and 
• subject to certain limitations63 to facilitate the satisfaction, 
settlement or withdrawal of such complaints whether by agreement, 
by making recommendations or awards or by such other means as 
seem expedient. 
Several points in relation to these provisions should be raised immediately. 
First, the Ombudsman is to consider the complaints at no cost to the 
complainant. This provision is essential in ensuring accessibility of the scheme 
to consumers. Secondly, the Ombudsman may give advice on the procedure for 
referring a dispute to her, but it is not to be her function to provide general 
information about Participating Banks or banking services.64 
Thirdly, the Ombudsman cannot consider complaints relating to claims over 
$100,000. While the Terms of Reference explicitly prevent the splitting of claims 
and deliberate under-claiming to attract jurisdiction, there is some flexibility for 
the Banking Ombudsman to consider claims in excess of $100,000 where the 
bank concerned consents to her doing so.65 This consent provision is also 
applicable to other claims that may fall outside the Terms of Reference, 
indicating the flexibility of the scheme and its desire to ensure that complaints 
63Terms of Reference paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22. 
64Terms of Reference paragraph 2. 
65Terms of Reference paragraph 19. 
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are able to be considered where the banks and Banking Ombudsman agree that 
they should be. 
Fourthly, "banking services" are defined as all financial services provided to 
individuals or groups by each of the Participating Banks in New Zealand in the 
ordinary course of their business. The use overseas of credit cards issued by 
Participating Banks and advice and services relating to insurance and 
investments are also included in this definition. The Terms of Reference also 
makes it clear that a complainant does not have to be a customer of the bank to 
be able to bring a complaint against it. 
The use of the word "financial services" as opposed to "banking services" not 
only avoids circularity in the definition, but also circumvents debate over what is 
encompassed in the ordinary or general law meaning of "banking business". 66 It 
would appear that any transaction under wh ich a Participating Bank receives , 
provides or transmits any form of finance would be encompassed in the 
definition, even if the transaction is novel or unique to one Participating Bank, 
provided that bank gives the service as part of the ordinary course of its 
business.67 
In addition to the limitations discussed above, the jurisdiction of the Banking 
Ombudsman is fettered in several ways. The most obvious fetter is that the 
Ombudsman can only investigate those matters specified in the Terms of 
Reference. Accordingly, she is prevented from investigating complaints that 
relate to a bank's commercial judgement in decisions relating to lending, security 
or general interest rates.68 She will , however, still have a residual power to deal 
with cases of maladministration in lending matters. She is also proh ibited from 
investigating banking practice or policy that does not itself give rise to a breach 
of any obligation or duty owed by the bank to the complainant. 69 
66Above n 45, 37. 
67Above n 45 , 37 . 
68Terms of Reference paragraph 18(b). 
69Terms of Reference paragraph 20. 
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Arguably two of the most contentious fetters on the Ombudsman's power 
concern the potential for the banks to remove a complaint from the 
Ombudsman's jurisdiction by commencing legal action against the complainant. 
In the first place, the Terms of Reference preclude the Banking Ombudsman 
from considering a complaint when its subject matter is also the subject matter of 
a court or tribunal proceedings. Thus, a bank may remove a complaint from the 
Ombudsman's jurisdiction by taking legal action against the complainant. 
However, the Ombudsman has commented that this would be clearly contrary to 
the spirit and purposes of the scheme and that she is satisfied that no bank 
would deliberately seek to withdraw a complaint from her jurisdiction in this 
way.70 
Secondly, the concept of "test cases" permits a Participating Bank, at any time 
before an award is made, to give notice to the Ombudsman containing a 
reasoned statement that the complaint involves a novel point of law or a 
question that may have important consequences for the bank concerned or for 
banks generally. Providing that the Banking Ombudsman concurs with the 
bank's statement, the investigation must then be discontinued. 
In doing this, the bank must give its reasons for nominating a complaint as a 
"test case". Significantly for the consumer, the bank must also give an 
undertaking that if either the complainant or the bank institutes court 
proceedings against the other party within six months of receipt of the notice, the 
bank will pay the applicant's costs and disbursements of the hearing and any 
appeal by the bank. There is also provision for the bank to make interim 
payments on account if the bank considers it reasonable to do so. 
In both the United Kingdom and Australia , this prov1s1on has been widely 
criticised for granting the banks too much power to remove a complaint from the 
Ombudsman's jurisdiction when it does not suit their interests. Arguably, the 
70ornce of the Banking Ombudsman Annual Report 1996-1997, 29 . 
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generous fees undertaking that is a prerequisite for the exercise of the provision, 
together with fact that the Ombudsman's concurrence is required makes it 
doubtful that this provision could be abused. 71 
Moreover, Burton argues that the test case and related provisions are important 
for both the efficiency and fairness of the system.72 Clearly, where there are a 
number of complaints on a single product or policy, the bank may wish to get 
legal ruling and the Banking Ombudsman will be favourable to such a request. 
Although the test case provision has not been used in New Zealand to date, it is 
under consideration at the moment in a case which the Ombudsman considers to 
be entirely appropriate for the test case process. 73 Literature about a new 
product introduced by a Participating Bank has been considered by the Banking 
Ombudsman and found to be misleading. The Banking Ombudsman has upheld 
several complaints on the matter and the bank has paid out compensation in all 
cases. Accordingly, the bank and the Ombudsman have agreed that if the office 
gets a further run of complaints, the bank will seek a firm legal ruling as to 
whether the information is misleading under the Fair Trading Act. 74 
D Complaint to Resolution: How the Scheme Works 
1 Procedure 
Subject to specific requirements in the Terms of Reference, the Ombudsman 
may use her discretion and control the procedure as she sees fit. 75 This 
flexibility enables the Ombudsman to vary the processes used, depending on the 
circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it is possible to view the Office of the 
Banking Ombudsman as comprising a formal inquisitorial or adjudicative 
framework within which a variety of other dispute resolution techniques such as 
71 Above n 46, 242 . See also above n 45 , 39. 
72Above n 45, 39. 
73Above n 38. 
74Above n 38. 
75Terms of Reference paragraph 3. 
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mediation, facilitation negotiation and conciliation may be used. Burton 
describes this as a "novel marriage of characteristics of dispute resolution 
structures". 76 
For example, mediation may be appropriate in a case where there are good 
grounds for settlement but the extremely strong sense of grievance that the 
complainant has, or the bank's attitude toward the complainant means that 
neither party is prepared to settle. The mediation may be seen as a way for the 
parties to "let off steam" and as a result be more willing to negotiate a 
settlement. 77 
This flexibility of process has also resulted in innovative ways of disputes. In 
one case involving racial discrimination, the Banking Ombudsman made a 
recommendation that the bank should apologise to the complainant. In the 
circumstances, it was considered appropriate for the bank to make the apology 
on the marae in front of the complainant's whanau. 78 The result was an apology 
that had more significance for the complainant. 
A complaint that comes into the office is initially screened to see whether it falls 
within the Banking Ombudsman's jurisdiction and whether it has been through 
the banks internal complaints process. Where a matter appears to fall within the 
Ombudsman's jurisdiction but has not been fully considered by a banks' internal 
complaints processes, the office will refer the matter back to the bank 
concerned . At this stage the matter will be referred to as a "complaint" . In the 
most recent annual report , 68 per cent of all cases received fell into this 
category.79 The other 30 per cent of cases that are within the Ombudsman's 
jurisdiction and have been fully considered by the banks internal complaint 
procedures are referred to as "disputes". 
76Above n 45 , 48. 
77 Above n 38 . 
78Above n 38 . 
79Above n 70 , 8. 
31 
Every dispute that comes into the office is allocated to an investigator who will 
take responsibility for the file. Assuming that the investigator is clear on what 
the dispute is about and does not need to gather more facts from the 
complainant, the investigator will notify the dispute to the bank concerned and 
ask for the bank's report on it. At this stage, the investigator may also seek 
information relating to the dispute. This may include the bank's file , police 
reports , videotapes or information from third parties such as accountants. 
It is important to note here that paragraph 11 of the Terms of Reference provides 
that at any time that a complaint is under consideration by the Banking 
Ombudsman, she may seek to promote a settlement or withdrawal of the 
complaint by agreement between the parties. Accordingly, if there is the 
possibility of settlement at any time within the initial investigation or the 
subsequent formal process, the Ombudsman will make every attempt to 
encourage this . 
Where there does not appear to be any likelihood of a settlement and the 
investigator is satisfied that he or she has obtained all the information necessary 
or available concerning the dispute, the investigator will draw up an "initial 
assessment". The initial assessment will often resemble a judgment in that it 
sets out the complaint; states what both sides have said about it; discusses the 
investigation that has been carried out; and mentions any appl icable law as well 
as the relevant provisions of the Code and any industry surveys80 that have been 
done. Finally, it will conclude with the Banking Ombudsman's assessment of the 
dispute and her proposed recommendation for settlement. The statistics 
provided in the Ombudsman's most recent Annual Report clearly show that the 
vast majority of complaints are dealt with at this stage. 81 It is complainants, 
rather than banks who are less likely to accept recommendations at this stage. 
80Where the Code is silent on a particular policy or practice, the Banking Ombudsman will 
conduct a survey of some or all of the Particpating Banks. This is in keeping with paragraph 
16(b) of the Terms of Reference that provides for the Banking Ombudsman to consult within 
the industry when determining the principles of good banking practice. 
81 Above n 70, 8-9 . 
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If either the complainant or the bank do not accept the initial assessment and 
make further submissions on it, the Banking Ombudsman will consider those 
submissions and pass them across to the other party for consideration. If the 
submissions reveal any new information, the Banking Ombudsman may carry out 
further investigation into the complaint and, if appropriate, issue a further initial 
assessment. 
If the matter is not settled at this stage, the Ombudsman moves on to a "formal 
recommendation". If this recommendation is unfavourable to the bank, then the 
bank is expected, in keeping with its membership of the scheme to act on such a 
recommendation . If a negotiated or recommended settlement or withdrawal 
requires the bank to pay money or provide other valuable consideration, then 
unless the bank otherwise requests or agrees, it will only be open for acceptance 
by the complainant "if he or she accepts it in full and final settlement of the 
subject matter of the complaint" . 82 Unless the complainant chooses to accept it, 
he or she is not bound by the process or the Ombudsman's decision and is left 
to pursue other means of resolution . 
If within one month after the Ombudsman has made a recommendation it is 
accepted by the applicant but not the bank, the Ombudsman may make a formal 
award against the bank. 83 Paragraph 14 of the Terms of Reference states that 
the award "shall comprise a money sum not exceeding $100,000". Paragraph 14 
also states that award is not to be 
of a greater amount than in the opinion of the Banking Ombudsman is appropriate to 
compensate the complainant for direct loss or damage suffered by him or her by reason 
of the acts or omissions of the Participating Banks against which the award is made. 
Although the Ombudsman has dealt with several cases close to the monetary 
limit, the average amount of compensation is less than $1000.00.84 It is also 
important to note that the award provision has only been used once in the history 
82Terms of Reference Paragraph 13(b). 
83Terms of Reference Paragraph 14. 
84Above n 38. 
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of the office in New Zealand. As the scheme has progressed, it is now 
comparatively rare to make a recommendation .85 
As discussed earlier, a recent amendment to the Terms of Reference provided 
for the award of a sum not exceeding $1 OOO to compensate a complainant for 
"inconvenience" suffered by reason of the acts or omissions of a bank. 
Following the wording used in parallel Ombudsman schemes overseas, 
"inconvenience" is intended to include stress, embarrassment, humiliation, 
distress and other detrimental effects that could not be considered under the 
provision to award direct loss. 
While the provision for indirect loss is an important addition to the powers of the 
Banking Ombudsman, the comparatively low monetary limit has lessened its 
significance. There does not appear to be any genuine reason for there to be 
such a disproportion between the sums awarded for direct and indirect loss, 
other than perhaps the banks' fears that any greater amount would result in 
consistently larger awards. 
However, this fear is probably unfounded given that the average sum for 
compensation is between $250 and $400 and that the Ombudsman has 
recommended the maximum sum in only one case in the past year. In that 
particular case, an extremely serious breach of privacy resulted in the ex-
husband of an abused woman gaining access to his wife's bank statements.86 
Fortunately, the breach was discovered before the husband was able to discover 
the whereabouts of his ex-wife. While the complainant in this case was rightly 
awarded the maximum sum, the Ombudsman considered that a more substantial 
award was warranted . 
A case in the United Kingdom highlights a different issue which may warrant a 
larger award for indirect loss. In that case, the bank wrongly listed the customer 
85Above n 38. 
86Above n 70, 12 
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as a bad debt with a credit reference agency.87 As the direct financial loss 
suffered by the customer was almost impossible to work out, the Banking 
Ombudsman awarded the equivalent of NZ$25,000 for indirect losses. 
2 Access to and Disclosure of Information 
To achieve fairness in dealing with disputes, both sides must be able to put their 
case forward . However, often the complainant will not be aware of information 
about the dispute that could help his or her case. In most cases, the bank 
concerned will have the critical information and documents within their exclusive 
possession. Accordingly, the Banking Ombudsman should ideally have a power 
to require mandatory production of this information. 
While the Parliamentary Ombudsman has the backing of statutory powers to 
obtain information from any person, the Banking Ombudsman may only rely on 
the Terms of Reference that require the defendant bank to provide any 
information relating to the complaint which is, or is alleged to be in the bank's 
possession. However, the Terms of Reference are only a contractual 
undertaking to the Commission and are unenforceable by the Banking 
Ombudsman except through the influence of the Commission. Tollemache 
argues that there is a big difference between having full statutory powers backed 
up by sanctions on the one hand and relying on the respondent bank to honour 
its commitment on the other.88 However, as Burton argues the incentive of 
enlightened self-interest is probably sufficient to for the information to be 
disclosed. 89 
In practice, the Banking Ombudsman notes that there are less problems with 
obtaining information now than when the scheme began.90 Most difficulties 
encountered now relate to the investigation of incidents that occurred several 
87 Above n 38. 
88Above n 46, 241. 
89Above n 45, 41 . 
90Above n 38 . 
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years ago. In some cases, the bank files may have been destroyed or lost. 
These difficulties are even more pronounced when the Ombudsman is dealing 
with a bank that no longer exists. 
3 Criteria for Decision-making 
The Banking Ombudsman scheme allows disputes to be solved on a broader 
equitable basis than would be possible in the courts, since the Terms of 
Reference explicitly require the Banking Ombudsman, in making any 
recommendation or award, to do so by reference to what is, in her opinion, fair in 
all the circumstances.91 Any applicable rule of law is to be observed, and regard 
must be had to the general principles of good banking practice and any relevant 
code of practice. 
The Australian Banking Ombudsman has identified a number of factors that he 
will take into account when determining what is fair in all the circumstances. 
These include the circumstances of the customer, the way in which the complaint 
has been handled by the bank and the capacity of the bank to control the 
systems which may be the subject of the complaint. 92 
It is important to note that the Ombudsman is not bound by previous decisions of 
the Office. This is significant as it removes the possibility of a bank arguing that 
it cannot make allowances for a particular customer as it would be forced to do 
the same for all other customers in similar situations.93 
E Effect on Banking Practice 
The Banking Ombudsman is empowered to make recommendations to the Chair 
of the Banking Ombudsman Commission from time to time in relation to the 
91 Terms of Reference Paragraph 16. 
92Above n 1, 326 . 
93Above n 46 , 240. 
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Terms of Reference or any relevant Codes of Practice that have a bearing on the 
discharge of her responsibilities. She will also make general comments about 
banking practice or policy in her annual reports and in her six-monthly reports to 
the Chief Executives of each of the Participating Banks. 
The six monthly reports set out the number of complaints against the banks for 
the previous six month period and also comment on any issues that have come 
up within that period. These may be issues that are generally applicable to the 
banking industry or are specific to a particular bank such as where a bank has 
had a number of complaints about a specific product. 94 The Banking 
Ombudsman will also comment on anything to do with administration of the 
scheme. This is viewed as a means of contributing to the bank's policy making 
process and, as such , has been effective at bringing about a change in policy in 
some situations.95 The Banking Ombudsman also has the opportunity to effect 
policy when banks approach her to comment on a new product or information 
leaflet in light of the sort of complaints that have been coming through the office. 
However, in contrast to the Parliamentary Ombudsman, the Banking 
Ombudsman is not able to initiate investigations of her "own motion". 
Significantly, the Banking Ombudsman does not consider this 'watchdog" role 
would be an appropriate function of her office given the framework that an 
industry sector Ombudsman works in.96 She maintains that the proper function 
of the Office is to resolve individual disputes between consumers and banks and 
to comment on banking policies and practice only to the extent that those 
complaints reveal a serious defect. 97 
94Above n 38 . 
95Above n 38 . 
96Above n 38 . 
97 Above n 38 . 
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VI ASSESSMENT OF THE BANKING OMBUDSMAN SCHEME 
Four criteria have been put forward by which to measure the performance of 
various dispute resolution schemes: independence; openness; accessibility and 
fair and effective procedures. As discussed earlier, the Retirement 
Commissioner has concluded that the Banking Ombudsman scheme meets the 
benchmarks set out for these criteria. 98 Although these benchmarks relate to the 
Australian environment, thereby casting some doubt on their application to the 
New Zealand context, it would be repetitive and of little use to restate these 
findings. Rather, this part of the paper will use these four criteria as convenient 
headings under which it will discuss matters that it considers significant to the 
central issue of access to justice for consumers. 
A Independence 
One of the fundamental problems facing any industry-run and funded scheme is 
undoubtedly the actual and perceived independence of the scheme. We can 
safely assume that after five years of operation in New Zealand, the Banking 
Ombudsman scheme has proven that it is actually independent from the 
institutions that established it. This is supported by the fact that it meets the 
benchmarks of the Retirement Commissioner. The question is, therefore, to 
what extent the perceived lack of independence prevents a consumer obtaining 
justice. 
The proposition usually put forward to resolve this issue of independence is to 
place the scheme on a statutory basis. This reflects the belief that a statute-
based scheme is inherently more independent and therefore more credible than 
98The Retirement Commissioner's report deals with the issue of openness under the heading 
of accountabilty . However, this paper will use the term openness because it encompasses a 
wider range of issues. 
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a private alternative because a public authority is assumed to be less self-
interested or better able to balance competing vested interests.99 
However, it would be both undesirable and unnecessary to place the Banking 
Ombudsman scheme on a statutory basis for several reasons. First, to do so 
would mean relinquishing two important aspects of the scheme, namely its 
flexibility and its ability to make an award binding on the bank. A statutory 
scheme would inevitably entail the loss of flexibility that is of crucial importance 
in the fast changing world of modern retail banking.100 Under a voluntary 
scheme, the Terms of Reference can be more liberally interpreted and if 
necessary, rapidly changed if exposed as defective or outdated in some respect 
than legislation.101 
Moreover, the Banking Ombudsman's power to make an award binding on the 
bank would be lost under a statutory scheme because of the "constitutional" 
principle that legislation should not block an individual's right of access to court 
for determination as to his or her legal position.102 This would create the risk that 
banks could choose to defy awards with which they are unhappy and also 
remove a key psychological factor that the Banking Ombudsman uses to 
promote an informal settlement between the complainant and the bank.103 
Secondly, the banks clearly perceive commercial and other advantages in terms 
of credibility and image in establishing and participating in an efficient, cost-
effective, quick, just and transparently independent dispute resolution 
mechanism for their smaller customers.104 Since the schemes inception, the 
banks have become more co-operative with the Banking Ombudsman, 
presumably as their faith in her ability to act impartially has increased and as 
they become accustomed to a less adversarial means of resolving disputes. 
99Above n 45, 46 . 
100Morris, P E "The Banking Ombudsman - 5 Years On" (1992) Lloyds Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 227, 232. 
101Above n 100, 232. 
102Above n 100, 232. 
103Above n 100, 232 
104Above n 45 , 47 
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Accordingly, there would appear to be no reason why they would jeopardise the 
credibility of the scheme by being perceived to diminish the independence of the 
Ombudsman. 
Thirdly, the arguments put forward in favour of a statutory scheme fail to 
recognise that the notion of independence does not mean that the Ombudsman 
should act in isolation from the institutions it supervises: liaison and 
communication are both necessary and helpful. 105 As the paper has discussed, 
the Ombudsman has successfully been able to effect changes to banking policy 
and practice, albeit generally on a small scale. 
Finally, it is submitted that the benefit gained by consumers in having a scheme 
that grants them easy access to a free, informal , quick and just means of dispute 
resolution significantly outweighs the potential lack of perceived independence 
by consumers. Given that empirical evidence has shown the scheme to be fa ir 
and impartial , the scheme is credible as it stands and consumers would not 
obtain better access to justice of the scheme was placed on a statutory basis. 
B Openness 
Clearly, one of the major tenets of our justice system is that it is "open", that is 
decisions are available to the public. This serves to inform people what the law 
regards as appropriate behaviour. In the context of consumer law, there is 
limited precedent because consumers have traditionally not been able to use the 
courts to gain redress for their grievances. This lack of precedent removes the 
potential leverage consumers would receive from precedents that are beneficial 
to them and deprives both organisations and consumers of clear rules to guide 
future conduct. 106 
105Above n 30, 316. 
106Above n 33 , 287. 
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Publication of individual cases in the Ombudsman's annual report is therefore an 
essential element of ensuring openness. Publication allows outsiders to assess, 
to some extent, how the scheme is working. This serves the function of 
educating the Participating Banks and consumers as well as demonstrating 
consistency and fairness in decision-making. In keeping with the confidentiality 
requirements of alternative dispute resolution processes, the written reports of 
the cases in the annual report do not name the parties involved. 
It has been argued that the confidentiality of alternative dispute resolution 
processes increases the power of financial institutions because it allows the 
institution to control information and thereby present a positive image of 
themselves. 107 The private nature of informal justice undoubtedly favours banks 
which would prefer that disputes with consumers not be made public. Adverse 
publicity may decrease consumers' trust and confidence in their financial 
institutions and may disclose practices and procedures which , even if perfectly 
legal , the institutions would prefer remain private.108 
However, while the confidentiality requirements of the scheme may mean that 
the public remains uninformed about offending banks, it is essential for the 
credibility of the scheme, and ultimately in the best interests of the consumer, 
that both parties names are kept confidential. 
C Accessibility 
The principle of accessibility requires that consumers must first be aware of the 
existence of the scheme as a means of third party redress and secondly that the 
procedures must be reasonably easy to use. Clearly, the procedures of the 
Banking Ombudsman scheme are easy to use. Once the complaint has been 
fully considered by the bank's internal complaints procedures and a deadlock 
107 Above n 33, 328 . 
108 Above n 33 285 ' . 
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has been reached, the complainant may contact the Banking Ombudsman who 
will investigate the dispute at no charge and attempt to achieve resolution . 
It is possible that complainants may be frustrated by the fact that they cannot 
make a complaint directly to the Ombudsman. However, it is a legitimate 
function of the Banking Ombudsman to refer complaints back to the bank 
concerned for both resource reasons and to enable the banks to attempt to 
resolve the dispute. In this way, banks can be aware of the type of complaints 
that are being made against them and adapt policy or practice accordingly. It 
also gives the banks the opportunity and incentive to improve their internal 
complaints procedures. 
However, it is submitted that there is a serious problem with consumer 
awareness of the scheme. This has the potential to have significant 
consequences beyond merely disadvantaging individual aggrieved consumers 
who are not aware they may gain redress from a third party. Although there is 
little empirical research in New Zealand about consumer awareness of the 
scheme, a survey by the Australian Banking Ombudsman showed that only 
approximately 17 per cent of consumers knew of the existence of the office.109 
The New Zealand Banking Ombudsman estimates that this percentage would be 
approximately the same in New Zealand.110 Given the number of consumers 
using banking services, this is undoubtedly a concerning result. 
It is submitted that the reason for this is that the Banking Ombudsman relies 
almost solely on the banks to inform their customers about the scheme.11 1 As 
discussed earlier, the Code requires banks to display information in their 
branches about their own internal complaints procedures. The staff of the 
Banking Ombudsman's office who occasionally carry out "spot-checks" of banks 
109Derived from personal interview with Banking Ombudsman above n 38. 
110Above n 38 . 
111 1nformation about the Ombudsman is also available at Citizen 's Advice Bureaux, 
Community Law Centres and Family Budgeting Centres. 
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have estimated that only half of the time the banks have any leaflets on display 
concerning complaints procedures.112 
More importantly, while banks are "encouraged" by the Banking Ombudsman to 
have information about the Banking Ombudsman's office and the Code on 
display, there is no obligation for them to do so and indeed many banks appear 
reluctant to display the information. 113 While bank staff seem generally aware of 
the need to tell customers who make direct inquiries of the existence of the 
Banking Ombudsman, the majority of problems arise where a staff member does 
not recognise that a problem is a complaint. Because of this, the complainant 
may be turned away without a resolution of the matter and not informed about 
the existence of the Ombudsman. In many cases, more effective staff training 
would remove this problem, especially in the light of the fact that banks are 
taking on more part time and casual front-line staff. 
Thus, the principal way that aggrieved consumers will find out about the scheme 
is when a deadlock has been reached with the bank and the bank refers the 
complaint to the Banking Ombudsman. The fundamental flaw with this is that if 
consumers are only made aware of the existence of the scheme once they have 
made a complaint, the scheme is only being directed at those who would have 
complained anyway. In colloquial terms, the bank is "preaching to the 
converted" . 
As previously mentioned, those who are most likely to complain are those from 
higher income, well-educated and consumer conscious backgrounds. Given the 
fact that banking customers now represent a broader cross- section of society, it 
is clear that those who are potentially the most disadvantaged are probably not 
being made aware of their right to take a grievance to the Ombudsman. The 
problem becomes even more pronounced when it is coupled with the fact that 
11 2Above n 38 . These spot-checks are usually carried out in the "vicinity of the office" 
meaning the banks along Lambton Quay, Wellington . 
113Above n 38. 
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the information brochures on the scheme and the Code are only produced in 
English. 
The consequences of this extend beyond merely disadvantaging those who have 
a unresolved grievance. If banks are basing their principles and policy on the 
type of complaints that are received by the Banking Ombudsman, it is clear that 
they may potentially be ignoring significant problems facing particular groups 
within society who, for some reason , do not voice their complaints. 
A suggested solution is for the Banking Ombudsman to either attract more 
complaints from a broader cross section of society by increasing the publicity of 
the scheme, or to have the power to investigate matters of her own motion. This 
is clearly a resource issue. The banks would need to commit to a greater level 
of funding if either of these solutions were to be real ised. Until this is done, the 
banks and the Ombudsman are wrong to believe that dealing with voiced 
complaints fairly discharges their responsibilities towards the public as a 
whole.11 4 
D Fairness 
Informal justice is often criticised for its lack of procedural safeguards. It is 
argued that when measured against formal legal criteria of justice, the processes 
are not seen as just. 11 5 However, proponents of informal justice argue that 
people's conceptions of fair procedures do not always equate with the formal 
structure of fair procedure in the traditional courts system.11 6 Four issues have 
been identified as dominating disputant assessments of procedural fairness : 
representation ; ethical appropriateness or interpersonal respect; neutrality, and 
outcome quality.117 
114Above n 10, 702 . 
115T Tyler "Procedure or result: what do disputants want from legal authorites?" in K Mackie A 
Handbook ()f Dispute Resolution: ADR in action (Routledge, London, 1991) 19. 
116Above n 115, 25. 
117 Above n 115 22 ' . 
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It is submitted that the Banking Ombudsman scheme is capable of meeting these 
criteria more adequately than the courts in the context of consumer disputes. 
However, before discussing these criteria further, it should be noted that fairness 
is a two way process. These criteria apply equally to an aggrieved consumer as 
they do to an alleged offending bank. 
The first element in feeling fairly treated is that a person feels they have had the 
opportunity to participate in the settlement procedure.118 This includes having 
the opportunity to present their side of the case, being listened to, and having 
their opinions considered by the third parties involved.119 In short, the 
opportunity to complain to a third party is only valuable if people believe that 
what they say has been considered by that third party. In this respect, the 
flexibility of the Ombudsman scheme is essential. Its ability to use different 
methods of resolution depending on the needs of the case ensures that the 
parties are more likely to feel they have had the opportunity of participation than 
if their case was heard in court. 
Secondly, people have been found to place great weight on being treated 
politely and having respect shown for their rights and themselves as people.120 
Although it is difficult to assess the extent to which the Ombudsman scheme 
achieves this, the example discussed earlier about the bank apologising to a 
customer on a marae indicates a willingness by the Banking Ombudsman to 
treat the parties with respect and ethnic appropriateness. 
The third issue of neutrality has already been discussed above. While it is clear 
that the Banking Ombudsman scheme achieves actual independence, the issue 
of the perception of independence may never be fully removed unless the 
scheme is placed on a statutory basis. For the reasons already mentioned, this 
would be undesirable. 
118Above n 115, 22. 
119Above n 115, 22. 
120Above n 115, 23 
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Finally, people feel more fairly treated if they receive a fair outcome.121 Clearly, 
disputes before the Banking Ombudsman may be resolved on a broader 
equitable basis than would be possible in the courts since the Terms of 
Reference explicitly require her to have reference to what is, in her opinion, fair 
in all the circumstances. Thus, she can more easily tailor a fair remedy to the 
specific case. 
It is also worthy to note that fairness demands a "level playing field". 122 To do 
this, it is essential that the Banking Ombudsman redresses the inherent 
inequality of power that exists between an individual and a wealthy and powerful 
bank. This paper has shown that the scheme gone a long way in achieving this, 
despite its shortcomings. In the words of the inaugural Australian Banking 
Ombudsman, at the very least, the scheme has managed to "get the earthmoving 
equipment onto that field". 123 
VII CONSUMERS AND "JUSTICE": A WIDER PERSPECTIVE 
This paper has shown that while the rights of consumers have been legislatively 
recognised , consumers have traditionally been unable to gain access to a public 
forum to enforce those rights. The increased use of alternative dispute 
resolution processes has undoubtedly given consumers a cheaper, easier and 
faster means of resolving their individual grievances. In short, consumers have 
been given "access to resolution". 
However, it remains doubtful whether these processes are capable of achieving 
"access to justice" for consumers in a wider sense because informal justice does 
not try to change behaviour or act in a judgmental manner. Its focus on process 
121Above n 115, 23 
122Above n 46 , 240 and see also above n 12, 191 . 
123Above n 12, 191 . 
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and not outcome means that it does nothing to solve the underlying problem that 
is the cause of many consumer complaints.124 
Commentators examining areas of the law other than consumer law make the 
distinction between public and private disputes. In a private dispute, only the 
interests and behaviour of the immediate parties to the dispute are at issue.125 
Because of the "localised" nature of the dispute, the privacy of informal justice 
does not conflict with the interests of society in having public decision-making 
forums. 126 
In contrast, a public dispute has been defined as one involving laws intended to 
protect the "public at large" and the enforcement of "society-wide norms".127 
These disputes are arguably inappropriate for alternative dispute resolution 
processes because the public's interest in enforcing the norms embodied in the 
laws is not represented .128 
The case for distinguishing public and private disputes is especially strong 
where the norms are in statutes enacted by the legislature to protect a 
disadvantaged segment of the public from the documented abuses of a specific 
industry. 129 Clearly, consumer protection laws fit within this category. It is 
therefore argued that only the enforcement of these laws through the courts can 
effectively solve the problem.130 
Certainly, individual complaints handling can also perform the role of quality 
control : the raising of standards and performances.131 However, given that only 
a small minority of consumers complain and that those complainants are more 
likely to be from better educated, higher income backgrounds, it may be that 
124Abel , R "The Contradictions of Informal Justice" in Abel (ed) The Politics of Informal 
Justice (Academic Press, New York, 1982) 267-311 , 294. 
125Above n 33, 322. 
126Above n 33, 322. 
127 Above n 33 322 
128Above n 33: 322: 
129Above n 33, 322. 
130Above n 33, 342. 
131Above n 30, 325. 
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those standards and performances are only "raised" in a way that suits the 
needs of those groups. Accordingly, there remains a need for some means of 
ensuring that wider policy issues affecting society as a whole are addressed. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
The Banking Ombudsman scheme is a prime illustration of the trend toward the 
privatisation of justice in core areas such as banking. There should be no doubt 
that the Banking Ombudsman offers an effective alternative for individual 
consumers of banking services who have a dispute with a Participating Bank. 
As the report by the Retirement Commissioner shows, it fulfils all the 
requirements of an ideal dispute resolution process discussed in Part Ill of this 
paper. However, the Banking Ombudsman scheme arguably falls down in its 
promotion of awareness of the scheme. As it currently stands, reliance on the 
banks to disseminate information about the scheme means that it is primarily 
only those consumers who have already made a complaint that are informed 
about the scheme. This has a number of flow-on effects. 
In the first place, consumers with a justified grievance may simply be denied 
access to justice. Moreover, given the over-representation of higher-income 
consumers in the numbers of voiced complaints, there is the potential for a 
distortion of the types of problems experienced by banking consumers in favour 
of this sector of society. It is trite to point out that lower-income or less 
consumer conscious people will encounter probably as many "injurious 
experiences" with banks that could be voiced as grievances. However, it cannot 
be assumed that the subject matter of these grievances will be the same as 
those who may have a higher income or are more consumer conscious. 
When these factors are combined with the fact that the banks look to the types 
of complaints received by the Banking Ombudsman as an aid in determining 
banking policy and practice, it is clear that classes of problems that deserve 
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attention may be completely overlooked. As suggested in the paper, to remedy 
this, banks will have to commit to a greater level of funding so that the Banking 
Ombudsman can promote the scheme more effectively. If this was to occur, the 
funding would also need to accommodate the potentially significant increase in 
complaints to the Office. An increase in complaints should be viewed as a 
positive step for the banks as it would give them a more accurate description of 
their customer base. This, in turn would allow them to adjust their policies 
accordingly and to improve their public profile and credibility with a wider range 
of consumers. 
An alternative remedy is for the Banking Ombudsman to be able to initiate 
investigations of her own motion. In this way, consultation with consumer groups 
from a wide range of affected groups in society would enable her to determine 
the specific problems facing those consumers. This alternative would also 
require a greater level of funding to ensure that the "watchdog" role did not 
eliminate the equally important function of individual grievance resolution . 
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